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Policy Dilemmas 
and 
Political Unrest 
in Poland 
David S. Mason 
Butler University 
The recent unrest in Poland is not simply a struggle between the workers and the regime 
over political freedom and economic reform. A basic cause of the unrest, as in past years, is 
the failure of the regime to balance adequately the conflicting policies of promoting long-term 
investment in industry, raising the standard of living, and reducing social class inequalities. 
Each of these policies represents a major goal of the regime, and of socialist ideology. The 
regime has not been able to emphasize all three goals simultaneously, and has shifted 
resources and attention from one to the other over the years. But the shifts themselves are 
disruptive and were a major factor in the unrest in 1980 as well as earlier years. 
1A ll political systems, in East and West, have to balance various interests 
and emphasize certain programs above others. This is both caused by 
and results in political conflict. Whether this conflict spills over institu- 
tionalized channels and becomes violent depends on the extent to which 
the aggrieved sectors of society can be mollified by material or 
psychological means, or repressed. These phenomena are frequently 
studied and well understood in Western societies. And Western social 
scientists have had some success in replacing the totalitarian and 
monolithic model of communist politics with a more pluralistic one that 
identifies the roles of elite conflict and interest group articulation. 
But whereas the earlier models identify conflict between the elite and 
the masses, and the later ones focus on conflict within the elite, neither 
has much addressed the role of conflicting interests in society, and the 
dilemmas that communist regimes face in balancing conflicting interests 
and promoting multiple goals. David Lane has criticized Western 
* The author wishes to thank Jack Bielasiak, Carol Nechemias, Maurice Simon, and two 
anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper; and the In- 
ternational Research and Exchanges Board for supporting research in Poland in 1982 which 
contributed to this article. 
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studies of political power in "state socialist societies" for concentrating "on 
the struggle for power between 'contending personalities and groups, 
rather than as the medium concerned with effectively mobilizing 
resources to achieve collective goals" (1976, p. 70). And Frank Parkin 
finds Western sociological research overly concerned with "the niceties of 
social differentiation" rather than the more important process of "mutual 
competition for scarce resources" among social groups (1979, pp. 29-30). 
For the regimes in the communist states the problem of balancing these 
conflicting demands is complicated by the existence of multiple goals: in- 
dustrialization, equality, and a higher standard of living. These regimes 
have not generally had the resources to pursue all three goals 
simultaneously. But when one or the other of them is emphasized dif- 
ferent social groups benefit and social tensions are fueled (Lane, 1971; 
Parkin, 1979). The fact of policy change itself also is disruptive, as old 
priorities are abandoned and entrenched interests are challenged. The 
dilemma for communist regimes then is a multiple one: they cannot pur- 
sue all goals at once; to emphasize only one risks the alienation and disaf- 
fection of the disadvantaged groups; and to shift policies will also bring 
about disruption. 
All of these issues have been particularly acute, and acutely visible, in 
Poland. The recent unrest in Poland is not simply a struggle between the 
workers and the regime over political freedom and economic reform. An 
underlying cause of the unrest, as in past years, has been the failure of the 
regime to balance adequately the conflicting policies of promoting long- 
term investment in industry, raising the standard of living of consumers, 
and reducing social class inequalities. Each of these policies represents a 
major goal of the regime, and of socialist ideology. Investments in in- 
dustry are necessary for the creation of an economic base sufficient for 
material abundance. Consumer policies are necessary both ideologi- 
cally,to fulfill the socialist promise of a higher standard of living, and 
politically, to maintain some degree of support for the regime. And the 
reduction of social class differences is necessary because it provides the 
very raison d'etre of a socialist polity. 
The Polish regime, of course, has not been able to emphasize all of these 
goals all of the time. Rather, it has shifted resources and attention from 
one to the other over the years, only occasionally attempting to make 
gains in all three simultaneously. But this poses a dilemma for the 
regime. Since different social groups benefit from the different policies, 
to ignore one policy area risks the alienation of major sectors of the 
population. Although the "strategy of imposed industrialization" 
(Morawski, 1980) may be consistent with past policies and therefore non- 
threatening to bureaucratic and managerial interests, it does require 
sacrifices from the population in terms of consumer goods. An emphasis 
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on the latter, on the other hand, may rectify this situation but jeopardize 
long-term growth and require economic or political decentralization with 
consequent possibilities of destabilization of the existing system. Social 
policies benefit the poor, but may undermine efforts to stimulate the 
economy with incentives and stricter productivity requirements. 
All of these tradeoffs are, of course, necessary in any society. But in 
Poland they have been particularly difficult for a number of reasons. 
First, the communist regime has never been able to develop an image of 
legitimacy, through either persuasion or compulsion, that is characteristic 
of most other governments in Eastern Europe. Second, the Poles have 
not quietly suffered from deprivation, and time after time have forced the 
regime to change its policies or its leaders in response to popular unrest. 
Third, the regime has not had either the resources or the ability to balance 
adequately the competing needs of the society, the party, and the bloc. 
These difficulties have been manifested in a dramatic way in increas- 
ingly demanding circumstances. Gomulka's emphasis on heavy industry 
at the expense of the consumer, for example, eventually alienated much of 
the Polish population. His government's intensified efforts at 
egalitarianism in the later 1960s, however, further incensed the white col- 
lar workers and the higher income groups. To put resources into all three 
policy areas, however, is only a short-term possibility, and risks the 
frustration of popular expectations when this effort is reversed or slowed. 
This was the pattern in the years 1953-56. But when the regime tried to 
maintain growth in all three areas for a sustained period, as it did in the 
1970s, the result was economic bankruptcy. The problem now is the op- 
posite one: the martial law regime is having to cut back in all three areas, 
and to do so in a forcible way besides. This is almost certain to increase 
social tensions and lead to another round of confrontation. 
This paper examines the problem of juggling of priorities among these 
three sets of policies, focusing in particular on the role of social policies, 
that is, those aimed at the reduction of social and economic differences. 
Social policy has been the most neglected of the three in Western studies 
of policy change and political unrest. Western scholars have tended to 
portray the major policy conflicts in Poland as between investment and 
consumption. Yet, social policy is at least as important as these two in 
terms of the regime's goals and popular support. 1 And the question of the 
role of social policy has been an important issue during Poland's periods of 
unrest, especially so during this last year. 
I will begin with a treatment of the meaning of social policy, and its 
role in socialist development in Poland. The next section will illustrate 
I See, for example, Connor (1979, pp. 110, 127; 1977, pp. 19, 24), Parkin (1971, p. 52), 
and Lane (1976, pp. 13, 27). 
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the nature of social policy and the timing of changes in this area by ex- 
amining a number of annual indicators of social policy, as well as several 
representative indicators of consumption and investment policies. The 
final section compares the developments in these three policy areas, and 
examines their relationship to the periods of unrest in 1956, 1970, and 
1980, and in the period before and after martial law. 
SOCIAL POLICY 
Western and Eastern socialists agree that the stimulation of social 
change is a major task, perhaps the major task, of a government. The 
British sociologist, Richard Titmuss, argued that "social growth-the 
need for integration, the need for more equality of opportunity, the need 
for freedom from want - deserves as much attention, intellectually as well 
as in terms of political action, as economic growth" (Reisman, 1977, pp. 
19-20). In communist countries, of course, the fundamental task has 
been to eliminate class distinctions based on property relationships, and 
the inequalities accompanying those distinctions. A Polish sociologist 
asserts that the abolition of classes "can only be accomplished by the 
gradual, yet systematic reduction of all important differences in the social 
status of individuals" (Wesolowski, 1965, p. 117), including differences in 
the character of labor (mental vs. manual), income, education, way of 
life, status and prestige. 
In Poland, the primary means to effect these changes is "social policy," 
which a Polish sociologist defines as those programs "aimed at improving 
the living conditions and work of broad strata of the population, 
eliminating inequalities, and raising the level of cultural life" (Szubert, 
1979, p. 30). Social policy includes a broad range of programs affecting 
employment, income, social security, health care, housing, and leisure. 
The government promotes social policy through expenditures for "social 
consumption" (which constitutes about 10 percent of total consumption), 
which has as its primary function "decreasing the differentials in con- 
sumption levels between households, and of bringing closer to realization 
the ideals of an egalitarian distribution of goods and services among 
members of society" (Krzyzewski, cited in Mieczkowski, 1975, p. 36). 
This egalitarian goal has been a continuous and fundamental one in 
Poland, although it has waxed and waned somewhat among the regime's 
priorities. To illustrate these changes I have selected a number of in- 
dicators which fit the category of social policy as described above: health 
and social insurance, education, housing, and wages. For each of them 
data are presented for all or most of the years from 1946 to 1980.2 
2 All of these data are from official Polish sources and, as such, must be used with some 
caution. But although the data may be distorted, it is likely that the distortion is in the same 
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Health and Social Security Policy 
The widening of access to health care has been a major element of 
social policy in Poland, as in other communist states. The 1952 Constitu- 
tion guaranteed all citizens the "right to health protection" and was reaf- 
firmed in the 1976 Constitution as the "right to free health care for all 
working people and their families," although this full coverage for the en- 
tire population was not achieved until 1974. Social security 
(ubezpieczenia spoleczne) is a broad concept in Poland, embracing a 
number of benefits including sickness benefits, old-age pensions, disabil- 
ity pensions, maternity and family allowances. 
The indicators used to examine these policies over time are health ex- 
penditures as a percentage of the total budget, social security expend- 
itures as a percentage of the budget, and the average monthly pension as a 
percentage of the average monthly wage. The annual data for these in- 
dicators appear in table 1. 
Education Policy 
In all societies, especially in revolutionary ones, education is a major 
means of familiarizing and inculcating the population with the goals, 
values, and regulations of the regime. This is recognized explicitly by the 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As a Polish educator notes, "next 
to land reform and the nationalization of industry, the educational 
reform [under the communist regime] was the essential factor that deter- 
mined the new economic, political, social and cultural face of a reviving 
Poland" (Swiecki, 1974, p. 321). Under the postwar regimes, education 
was treated "as a means of changing the social structure inherited from 
the previous system." The specific goals of education were the elimina- 
tion of illiteracy and the reduction of class differences (Allardt and 
Wesolowski, 1978). 
The goal of universal literacy has been largely accomplished. The 
mechanism for doing so has been a large-scale expansion in the number of 
schools and universities and in access to them. Since the state has as- 
sumed control over education, the funding for this has come from the 
government budget. The commitment to the expansion of education, 
then, can be tapped by the percent of the total budget allocated to educa- 
tion (see table 2). 
direction over the years studied. If the distortion is relatively constant, then the analysis of 
the changes in the data over time will not be greatly affected. When the method of calcu- 
lating a particular indicator is changed, comparison across the year of change is more diffi- 
cult. I have adjusted for variations of this sort when possible, and have indicated these 
adjustments in the tables. 
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TABLE 1 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY, 1950-80 
Average Monthly 
Percent of Total Budget spent on: Pension as % of 
Year Health Social Security Average Monthly Wage 
1951 5.8 10.3 16.7 
1952 4.6 9.3 16.4 
1953 3.6 7.0 17.6 
1954 4.2 8.3 18.2 
1955 4.5 8.6 19.1 
1956 4.9 9.3 20.2 
1957 5.3 10.4 24.6 
1958 5.4 11.1 32.9 
1959 6.2 11.9 40.7 
1960 6.2 11.0 39.7 
1961 5.9 10.0 39.8 
1962 6.0 10.0 40.1 
1963 6.5 10.8 40.0 
1964 6.3 10.6 40.7 
1965 6.4 10.7 41.8 
1966 6.5 10.2 41.8 
1967 7.1 10.8 42.0 
1968 7.4a 12.1 45.2 
1969 7.3 12.6 48.6 
1970 7.1 12.8 (4.4)b 51.2 
1971 7.0 14.5 (5.1) 51.5 
1972 7.3 14.4 (5.2) 50.2 
1973 7.8 (5.1) 46.6 
1974 7.1 (4.8) 43.6 
1975 6.8 (5.2) 40.8 
1976 6.7 (4;3) 40.8 
1977 6.6 (4.4) 43.9 
1978 6.4 (4.3) 47.4 
1979 6.7 (4.0) 48.3 
1980 7.0 (4.3) 46.3 
a 1968-69 data adjusted to be comparable to other years. 
b Percentages based on revised (in 1973) method of calculations in Polish sources. 
Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny Finansow 1945-1967 (Warsaw: 1968) and annual volumes 
for 1971, 1973, 1978, 1979; Rocznik Statystyczny 1981, pp. xxxiv-xxxv and 583, 585. 
Wage Policy 
Remuneration through wages has two basic functions according to 
Polish sociologists: "to satisfy human need," and "to guide and evoke cer- 
tain modes of behavior" such as by providing incentives to raise produc- 
tivity (Sarapata, 1966). These two goals are not always complementary, 
and wage policy is constantly pulled in opposite directions by demands for 
economic growth on the one hand, and a more egalitarian social system 
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on the other. In a sense these two contradictory goals reflect the basic 
tension within all communist countries. They are trying to revolutionize 
society by eliminating classes based on property, but they have not yet 
achieved the level of material prosperity that Marx postulated as neces- 
sary for these changes. 
TABLE 2 
EDUCATION AND HOUSING POLICY, 1946-80 
Housing Investments Education Expenditures as 
Year as Percentage of Total Percentage of State Budget 
1946 24.8 
1949 15.4 
1950 11.7 
1951 11.6 7.7 
1952 10.6 6.6 
1953 10.6 5.6 
1954 13.0 6.4 
1955 15.1 6.7 5.5b 
1956 17.3 5.8 
1957 19.5 5.7 
1958 20.9 5.8 
1959 19.7 6.0 
1960 19.3 6.0 
1961 19.0 5.7 
1962 16.8a 5.7 
1963 16.5 6.1 
1964 16.4 6.1 
1965 15.0 7.0c 6.2 
1966 14.9 7.1 
1967 14.7 7.5 
1968 14.8 7.8 
1969 14.5 7.7 
1970 15.6 7.5 
1971 15.4 8.0 
1972 13.9 8.2 
1973 13.3 8.5 
1974 12.3 7.4 
1975 13.1 7.2 
1976 14.2 7.0 
1977 16.0 6.7 
1978 17.4 6.4 
1979 19.2 6.5 
1980 21.0 6.4 
a 1946-61 in 1961 prices; from 1962, current prices. 
b Revised method of calculation in Polish sources for 1956-65. 
c Revised method of calculation in Polish sources from 1966. 
Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny Gospodarki Mieszkaniowej i Komunalnej 1965 (Warsaw: 
1967), p. 174; Rocznik Statystyczny Finansow 1945-1967 (Warsaw: 1968); Rocznik Statys- 
tyczny, 1966-80, and 1981, pp. 583, 184. 
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There is, though, a recognition of the importance of wages in the deter- 
mination of social and class differences. Adam Sarapata (1966), for ex- 
ample, emphasizes that the narrowing of wage differences between 
manual and mental laborers also has led to changes in ways of life and 
mental attitudes of workers. And Jan Malanowski in listing the 
"numerous manifestations of social inequality" in societies mentions first 
one's "material position," especially in housing and wages. But there is 
also recognition of the need to maintain income differentials as well, to 
maintain adequate incentives for labor effort and economic growth 
(Sarapata, 1966; Wesolowski, 1966). 
Although growth in real wages is used below as a measure of consumer 
policy, wage differentiation is a useful indicator of egalitarianism, and 
thus of social policy. Data on the changes in income equality appear in 
table 3. There are two indicators in this table. The first measures the 
average wage levels among the different social groups in Polish society.3 
The table compares the highest paid group, the intelligentsia, and the 
lowest paid salaried workers, state farm workers, with blue collar 
workers. Since the method of reporting these data in the Polish statistical 
sources has changed several times, the data are not comparable over the 
whole thirty-year period. But one can use the data, as we do here, to ex- 
amine changes over shorter periods within each set of calculations. The 
second set of data (third column) is the ratio of the average wages of the 
top 10 percent of workers in the socialized economy to those of the bottom 
10 percent.4 
Housing Policy 
Housing has an important place in social planning in Poland for two 
reasons. First, adequate housing, especially housing space, is considered 
a major component of the standard of living, and the state has assumed 
the major role in the construction of new residential housing. Second, 
differences in housing are an important "manifestation of social inequal- 
ity," as noted above, and the housing policy of the state has been directed 
at "equalising the housing conditions of workers and intelligentsia" 
(Wesolowski, 1966, p. 28). This desired effect has not always been 
3For a comparison of Poland with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the USSR on 
this dimension see Connor (1979, p. 231). 
4These figures are calculated from data reporting the percentage of all workers receiving 
salaries at various levels. There is some problem with these data in that the wage scales are 
open ended at both top and bottom. To make these calculations here, the top and the bottom 
wage categories were assumed to have the same range as the penultimate categories at each 
end. The small percentage of workers in these two categories also tends to minimize the 
distortion. 
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achieved (see, for example, Lane, 1976, p. 181; Lane and Kolankiewicz, 
1973, pp. 127-28) but, nevertheless, has absorbed a sizable percentage of 
total investments, as indicated in table 2. 
TABLE 3 
INCOME DIFFEENTIALS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND DECILES 
Index of Wagesa (Workers = 100): Ratio of Top 10% to 
State Farm Bottom 10 % in 
Year Intelligentsia Workers Socialized Economy' 
1945 41.1 
1947 13.8 
1950 180c 
1954 152 
1955 157 67c 
1956 163 67 5.2 
1957 160 61 5.4 
1958 159 64 5.4 
1959 158 68 5.3 
1960 160 72 5.1 
1961 162 72 4.8 
1962 162 71 4.8 
1963 161 71 4.8 
1964 166 71 4.6 
1965 164 73 4.7 
1966 161 74 
1967 160 74 4.8 
1968 158 75 
1969 154 74 
1970 153 74 3.7 
1971 151 75 
1972 149 146d 81 83d 3.7 
1973 144 87 3.8 
1974 141 85 
1975 130e 138 100l 79 
1976 131 5.1 
1977 132 101 
1978 132 110 4.9 
1979 129 107 
1980 123 107 4.3 
a Net wages in socialized industry for blue collar workers and engineering-technical 
workers (here "intelligentsia"). 
b Some of these ratios calculated by using lower 10% data from one source, and upper 
10% from another, when two sources provided more detail. 
c Gross wages, 1950-72. 
d Net wages, 1972-80. 
e New method of calculation in Polish sources for 1975-80. 
Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny 1948-80; and 1981, pp. 166, 250, 333. Rocznik 
Statystyczny Pracy 1945-1968 (Warsaw: 1970), p. 463. 
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CONSUMER POLICY AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 
As a basis for comparison with social policy, I have presented in tables 4 
and 5 some representative indicators of both consumer policy and invest- 
ment policy. Consumer policy, as it is used here, refers to those govern- 
ment programs aimed at improving the overall standard of living of the 
population. This includes efforts to increase the level of wages and per- 
sonal income, to increase the share of national income and investments for 
consumption, and to increase the availability and quality of consumer 
goods, including food. 
TABLE 4 
CONSUMER POLICY, 1949-80 
Real Wages: % Consumption as Per Capita Consumption 
Change From % of National of Meat 
Year Previous Year Income (kilograms) 
1949 ---- 82.8 28.0 
1951 -0.9 77.1 36.7 
1952 -6.1 74.7 32.7 
1953 -1.4 68.0 35.2 
1954 12.8 74.5 36.2 
1955 7.1 78.6 37.7 
1956 11.6 80.5 41.0 
1957 8.3 78.3 43.9 
1958 3.3 78.2 45.3 
1959 5.1 78.0 44.1 
1960 -1.5 76.9 42.5 
1961 2.6 76.1 45.2 
1962 0.4 77.3 45.8 
1963 2.4 76.0 46.3 
1964 2.1 75.9 47.1 
1965 0.0 74.6 49.2 
1966 3.3 73.8 51.0 
1967 2.5 74.6 52.3 
1968 1.3 73.3 52.2 
1969 1.7 74.6 52.6 
1970 1.3 73.9 53.0 
1971 5.5 72.5 56.1 
1972 6.6 70.4 59.3 
1973 8.7 67.0 62.1 
1974 6.6 64.4 65.6 
1975 8.5 64.8 70.3 
1976 3.9 65.9 70.0 
1977 2.3 68.6 69.1 
1978 -2.7 69.4 70.6 
1979 2.0 74.3 73.0 
1980 4.0 80.7 74.0 
Sources: Rocznik Statystyczny, 1971-80; 1981, pp. 113, xxxv, li. 
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Consumer policies are distinguished from social policies in two impor- 
tant ways. First, social policy is aimed specifically at the disadvantaged 
in society and at social and economic differentiation, whereas consumer 
policies provide for the whole population. Second, social policy is ac- 
complished by government allocations (e.g., housing, education) or 
regulation (wage differentials) and is delivered to the population as serv- 
ices, whereas consumer policy provides money income (through wages) 
and consumer products (through investments) for direct purchase.5 
TABLE 5 
INVESTMENT POLICY, 1949-80 
Total Investments % of Investments in 
Year (Previous Year = 100) Producer Goods 
1949 113.9 65.0 
1951 112.2 70.6 
1952 118.7 73.5 
1953 115.2 73.1 
1954 105.9 71.4 
1955 104.0 68.5 
1956 104.7 68.0 
1957 107.8 65.7 
1958 110.3 64.0 
1959 116.6 63.9 
1960 105.9 63.8 
1961 107.3 66.1 
1962 109.7 68.9 
1963 102.7 70.0 
1964 104.7 70.0 
1965 109.5 72.0 
1966 108.4 72.8 
1967 111.3 73.4 
1968 108.7 73.3 
1969 108.2 74.1 
1970 104.1 73.1 
1971 107.4 75.1 
1972 123.0 77.0 
1973 125.4 77.9 
1974 122.3 78.4 
1975 110.7 79.1 
1976 101.0 78.5 
1977 103.1 77.4 
1978 102.1 75.7 
1979 92.1 73.0 
1980 87.7 72.6 
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1981, pp. xxxiv-xxxv. 
5 For a definition of "social consumption" see Mieczkowski (1975, pp. 19-21). 
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The trends of the three consumer policy indicators in table 4 are quite 
uniform. The last of the Stalin years showed declines in each of the three 
areas. Beginning in 1953 or 1954, there is a steady improvement in con- 
sumption levels that continues until 1958-59. There is a leveling off or 
stagnation in each of the areas until the late 1960s, when there is some in- 
crease in all of them. The new Gierek leadership initiated a dramatic 
and sustained five-year growth in both wages and meat consumption. The 
share of national income to consumption actually declined rather sharply 
during this period, though this partially reflects a rapid growth in total 
national income during the period. The late 1970s witnessed a stagna- 
tion in consumer welfare, though consumption's share of the national in- 
come actually began to increase again. 
Investment policy, as it is treated here, refers to the policy of the 
government to promote investments, particularly in producer goods, for 
the purposes of fostering "socialist industrialization." This industrializa- 
tion is considered necessary for the construction of a socialist society, and 
in particular for the rapid rate of economic growth necessary to catch up 
with the industrialized West (Morawski, 1978). 
Probably the best indicator for tracing changes in investment policy is 
the percentage of investments allocated for producer goods, presented in 
the second column of table 5. Productive investments increased steadily 
during 1951-53, then began a steady decline with the beginning of the 
new course in 1953-54. This decline continued until 1961, when produc- 
tive investments again began to grow. This growth lasted through the 
1960s, leveled off somewhat in the period 1969-71, then began to grow 
again, reaching record levels in 1974-76. This was the period of Gierek's 
economic renewal, which called for rapid modernization of Poland's in- 
dustrial base. After 1975, there was a significant decline in the growth of 
total investments in the productive sector. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND POLITICAL UNREST 
The relationship between policy change and political unrest in com- 
munist countries has been examined by Mieczkowski (1978), Bunce 
(1980a), Bunce and Echols (1978), Mason (1978), and others. In most of 
these, though, policy change is seen as a result of political unrest or 
leadership changes rather than a contributing factor. Bunce, for exam- 
ple, sees socialist leaders as "rearranging priorities in their first year in of- 
fice" in order to win support of the masses. Later, however, when suc- 
cession is no longer at issue, "other interests line up at the trough for their 
fair shares and the emphasis on mass concerns withers away" (1980b, pp. 
966, 972). 
Here, however, we examine the extent to which policy changes 
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themselves contribute to unrest and leadership change. As will be seen 
below, the issue of balancing conflicting interests and juggling priorities is 
a problem of continuous concern to the Polish leadership, and a source of 
constant tension in Polish society. The dilemma is a permanent one, not 
episodic. This will be illustrated by a comparison of the trends in social 
policy with those in consumption and investment policies. These reveal 
some interesting patterns that help explain the periods of unrest in 
Poland. 
The Thaw and the 1956 Succession 
From 1950 through 1953, the first years of the first Six-Year Plan, in- 
vestment took precedence over both social policy and consumer policy. 
With the death of Stalin in 1953 and the inauguration of the new course in 
the Soviet Union, Poland also began to change direction. Beginning in 
1954, both social policy and consumption policies were emphasized at the 
expense of industrial investments. This increased emphasis on social 
policy and consumption policy continued through the 1956 unrest and 
succession, and began to taper off only in 1959 and 1960. This trend 
prevails for virtually all of the indicators in all four of the policy areas 
discussed above.6 The popular disturbances of 1956, therefore, cannot 
be understood simply in terms of economic dissatisfaction or declines in 
the standard of living. The years before 1956 had seen rapid increases in 
both wages and consumption, especially of meat products. 
There are, however, three other factors of importance here. First of 
all, the very nature and extent of the political and economic changes in 
Polish society in the 1954-56 period had fostered greatly heightened ex- 
pectations of further improvements. This is in line with Gurr's theory in 
Why Men Rebel (1970) that revolts tend to occur not when conditions are 
at their worst, but when they are improving, and when expectations 
begin to exceed reality. 
Second, any revolution needs a spark, and what sparked the disturb- 
ances in Poznan in June 1956 was a bread shortage. This was due in part 
to a poor harvest in grains in 1956, resulting in a significant decline in per 
capita grain consumption for that year. Consumption of most other 
products, food and otherwise, was up substantially in that year. But the 
combination of rising political and economic expectations and a shortfall 
in the availability of the most basic food commodity was enough to ini- 
tiate the disturbances. These eventually escalated and led to the removal 
of party leader Ochab and the return to power of Gomulka. 
8f These results are contrary to studies by Bunce (1976; 1980a), Mieczkowski (1978), and 
others that have pointed to the succession years as the key factor in initiating policy changes. 
As is apparent from tables 1-5 in this paper, the shifts in policy usually began several years 
before each of the successions of 1956, 1970, and 1980. 
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Third, although the reforms of 1954-56 had benefitted most people in 
Poland, some benefitted more than others. Although the data in table 3 
do not permit a definitive judgment on this issue, it is likely that the most 
highly skilled (and paid) workers did not experience as much improve- 
ment in their living standards as did less well paid people. The emphasis 
on social security and pensions, for example, allowed pensioners to gain 
somewhat on wage earners (see table 1). Indeed, it was the highly skilled 
workers of the Cegielski Engineering Works in Poznan who initiated the 
protests that eventually spread throughout the country.7 
The reforms of the early 1950s, in Poland as in the Soviet Union, were 
meant to improve the standard of living and generate some legitimacy for 
the regime without recourse to coercion. The shifts in policy, though, 
also had unexpected results. Old patterns were disrupted, new social 
groups were favored, and new expectations were engendered. The 
economic and political change of 1954-56 was too slow for the popula- 
tion; the demands for Gomulka's return reflected the expectation of fur- 
ther change. 
The Gomulka Years and the 1970 Succession 
Gomulka's eventual return to economic orthodoxy and political 
conservatism is a familiar one, although analysts differ on the reasons for 
this. Certainly one of the reasons, however, was that the regime could 
not sustain the continued fortification of consumer and social policy and 
renew the development of industry and investments at the same time. The 
burden on the budget of all these policies was substantial. The increased 
allocations for social and consumer policies had continued through 1959. 
But the slide in productive investments also had been halted by that year. 
Consequently, total investments in 1959 increased by almost 17 percent 
over 1958. The rapid increase in expenditures in all three areas had by 
1959 caused the state budget to increase by 57 percent over 1954. These 
rates of growth were much faster than the growth in the economy and 
could not be sustained. So emphasis on consumer and social policies was 
ended, and investments once again took precedence. 
Through most of the 1960s productive investments grew, whereas 
allocations for social policies remained at 1959 levels, and consumption 
and wages stagnated. But by the late 1960s the priorities began to change 
again. Investment levels remained high during this period, even increas- 
ing somewhat. Wage increases in the years 1967-69 were the lowest of 
any three-year period since the early 1950s. Per capita consumption, 
especially of meat products, did not increase during this period. There 
7John Montias offers other explanations for the activism of skilled workers: their trade 
union history, their "workers' culture," and their shop floor organization. 
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was, however, a renewed emphasis on social policy, beginning about 
1967. Tables 1-3 demonstrate that for every social policy indicator, there 
was a marked change initiated in the three years before 1970. Health, 
social security, and education allocations and pensions all jumped 
significantly in 1967. There was also a substantial narrowing in the wage 
gaps during the period from 1967-70. In housing the pattern is not as 
clear, but there was a marked increase here as well in 1970, before the 
December succession. 
In all of these cases the stress on social policy began several years before 
the succession, and carried across the succession for several years. The 
motivation for this shift in policy seems to be twofold. On the one hand, 
the regime may have felt that it was time to shift some resources back into 
consumption, direct (personal) or otherwise (social). By 1968 social and 
consumer policy had been neglected for almost a decade. On the other 
hand, there seems to have been an intensification of the ideological drive 
toward egalitarianism in the late 1960s. This was partly a response to the 
challenges by the "technocrats" to Gomulka and the dominant party 
leadership, and was invigorated by the disturbances of March 1968 in 
Poland and the spring and summer of that year in Czechoslovakia 
(Weydenthal, 1978). Consequently, the resources available to the 
population were channeled into social policy, which supports egalitarian 
principles, rather than into consumer policy, which does not. 
As in 1956 bad harvests in 1969 and 1970 had exacerbated the food 
shortages, particularly in meat. It was largely in response to these prob- 
lems that the regime decided upon an increase in food prices in December 
of 1970. This was like rubbing salt into the wounds of the workers who 
had experienced depressed wages and consumption levels over the 
previous three years. The disturbances initiated in the shipyards on the 
Baltic coast were met by force, which only served to inflame and widen 
the unrest. Once again, the party first secretary was replaced. 
The situation in 1970 was quite different from 1956, however. The 
1956 disturbances, as noted above, came after a period of substantial im- 
provement in conditions and were at least partly a result of rising and 
frustrated expectations. The 1970 unrest followed no such improvement, 
and was in fact a manifestation of protest against the continuing stagna- 
tion of wages, consumption, and the management of the economy. But 
there were other forces at work here too. While the economy as a whole 
may have been depressed in the late 1960s, there were differential impacts 
on different social groups. As is apparent from table 3, the relative wages 
of the intelligentsia and the better paid workers had eroded substantially 
in this period, while conditions for the less well off had improved 
somewhat as a result of some leveling of wages and increased allocations 
for health, social security, pensions, and education. 
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The demands made by the dockworkers and miners, who are among 
the most highly paid workers in Poland, were largely economic (wage in- 
creases, price freezes, tax reduction) and political, not social. One could 
view the 1970 disturbances, then, as partially a demand for attention and 
resources by those who did not benefit from the social policies emphasized 
in the previous years. 
The response of the new Gierek regime did not entirely satisfy the 
workers. Although Gierek did promise a two-year freeze on food prices, 
better market supplies, and more housing, the wage increases announced 
at the end of December were aimed largely at low income families and 
workers since they were the ones who were most directly affected by food 
price increases. Along similar lines, it also was decided to increase the 
minimum wage by 17.6 percent and family allowances by 25 percent and 
to improve pension and disability payments. But as George Blazynski 
points out: "the initial economic concessions offered nothing to skilled in- 
dustrial workers who already earned more than 3000 zlotys a month. 
They continued, therefore, to press for either adequate wage increases on 
a national scale or for a complete abolition of Gomulka's price increase 
package" (1979, p. 41). Eventually the workers prevailed; Gierek 
rescinded the December price increases and he promised across-the-board 
wage increases. With the revision of the 1971-75 Plan in June 1971, in- 
dividual and social consumption was to increase by 38 percent, compared 
to 27 percent in the previous five-year plan period, and real wages were to 
increase at an annual average rate of 3.4 percent, almost twice that of the 
previous decade (Blazynski, 1979, p. 75). 
The Gierek Years 
The policies pursued by the Gierek regime in the next several years 
were unprecedented in Poland's postwar history in that there were major 
advances in all three policy areas: consumption, social policy, and invest- 
ment. Gierek's modernization plan called for a rapid modernization of 
Polish industry and an improvement in agricultural production, both of 
which required greatly increased levels of investment. But there also 
were to be significant increases in wages and in the availability of con- 
sumer goods as incentives to increased productivity, and as a means to 
avoid further unrest. 
Meanwhile, the increased allocations for social policy begun under 
Gomulka continued under Gierek through 1972 or 1973. The promised 
wage increases for the lowest paid groups further narrowed the gap be- 
tween rich and poor. Housing construction targets were revised upward 
by 25 percent under the new 1971-75 plan. But since capital investment 
for modernization and increased consumption to stimulate productivity 
were the key elements of Gierek's long-term plan, social policy was de- 
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emphasized somewhat after 1973. The increase in expenditures for hous- 
ing, education, and health and welfare could not keep up with the growth 
in the economy, and the move toward wage equalization was postponed 
to provide incentives for increased productivity. 
Poland's economy and standard of living grew at an unprecedented rate 
during the years 1971-75. National income grew at an average annual 
rate of almost 12 percent, and real wages by over 7 percent a year. Gross 
agricultural output grew at 3.7 percent a year, and livestock production 
at 5.3 percent annually (Newcomb, 1981). Per capita meat consumption 
grew from 53 kilograms in 1970 to 70 kilograms by 1975, higher than that 
in some West European states. All of this occurred despite a declining 
share of the national income for consumption, as capital investments also 
increased at a record pace. 
This high rate of growth in all sectors of the economy could not have 
been possible without massive amounts of foreign capital, a rapid ac- 
celeration of technology transfer, and agricultural imports from the West. 
By 1975 Poland was a net importer of foodstuffs, her foreign trade deficit 
was 7.5 billion zlotys and her hard currency debt had reached $8 billion, 
from only $1.1 billion in 1971. 
By 1976 the economy was in serious trouble. Although there had been 
cutbacks in social policy, personal incomes and investments continued to 
increase at almost unmanageable levels. Although the planned increases 
in these areas were high, actual increases were even higher. In 1971-75 
both real wages and investments increased by about twice the planned 
rate. As Fallenbuchl describes the situation: 
The planners lost control over both investment and personal income because of political and 
social pressures, which were created by the backlog of long postponed increases in wages, 
pensions and social welfare payments, shortages of consumption goods and services, and com- 
peting claims on limited resources by sectors which had enjoyed priority in the past and were 
anxious to maintain their privileged position and those that had been neglected and wished to 
make up for it now (1981, p. 38). 
These rates of growth could not be sustained even without increased ex- 
penditures for social policy. The 1975 draft for the 1976-80 five-year 
plan called for rates of growth in personal incomes (18 percent), in- 
vestments (40 percent), and industrial (50 percent) and agricultural pro- 
duction (16 percent) that were only about half of the rates actually 
achieved in 1971-75 (Blazynski, 1979; Fallenbuchl, 1981). With these 
reduced growth levels for consumption and investment, though, social 
policy was partially revitalized, with welfare payments to increase by 70 
percent and housing construction by 40 percent. Again, it seems that 
social policy was being used to help the population adjust to planned 
reductions in consumption and wages. 
Another feature of the new plan, of course, was the decision to ra- 
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tionalize the price and production structure of agriculture. Agricultural 
production and consumption had increased dramatically in the years 
1971-74, but bad harvests in both 1974 and 1975 had reduced the 
availability of some foods, especially meats. The problem was com- 
pounded by the fact that real incomes in Poland had grown much faster 
than the production of either consumer goods or agriculture, causing de- 
mand for food, especially meat, to exceed supply. The artificially low 
meat prices, frozen since 1971, put further pressure on supplies. 
The regime's sudden implementation of drastic price increases for food 
in June 1976 led to strikes and demonstrations that forced the govern- 
ment, for the second time in six years, to rescind the food price increase. 
This placed the regime in a major dilemma. The rationalization of 
agricultural prices was a key element in the plan to reduce Poland's 
foreign debt. The failure to achieve this meant that the regime had to de- 
pend even more heavily on foreign loans. Moscow responded with a one 
billion ruble loan, increased supplies of consumer goods, and a resump- 
tion of grain deliveries. Meanwhile, although imports of machinery and 
equipment from the West were reduced, grain purchases were increased 
to boost domestic food supplies. All this, of course, simply deepened 
Poland's foreign trade deficits and debt, and postponed the solution to the 
problem. 
By this time Poland again was experiencing the phenomenon that 
characterized the 1956 unrest -the revolution of rising expectations. In 
the years since 1970 personal incomes, social services, and consumption 
levels had grown at unprecedented rates. By 1976 the regime found it no 
longer could sustain such rates of growth. The efforts to cut back, even if 
they did not result in absolute reductions in the standard of living, did 
frustrate popular expectation of continued growth. The inability of the 
leadership to inform the population of the problems and solutions, and to 
initiate public discussion of these issues, contributed to the sense of 
frustration and led to a standoff between the party and the population for 
the next several years. Meanwhile, the economic policies of the regime 
became increasingly untenable and dangerous. 
THE 1980 EVENTS 
By 1980 a significant portion of Poland's $20 billion currency debts was 
due for repayment, and Western bankers were demanding economy 
measures in Poland in order to extend the loans. Governmental subsidies 
for food production were swallowing up 25 percent of the state budget in 
1980. It was in this climate that the regime once again attempted to raise 
food prices in the summer of 1980. Once again, the process was a clumsy 
one with little public consultation or advance warning. But even at this 
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time, when the economy was in shambles, the tug of social policy was evi- 
dent. In Gierek's explanation of food price increases he promised that the 
revenues from this gain would "in their entirety" be used to improve the 
lot of the lowest income groups, as well as single mothers, large families, 
and pensioners (Robinson, 1980, pp. 33-36). This, however, did not 
mollify the workers who wanted across the board wage increases for all 
workers. The "21 demands" from the Interfactory Strike Committee 
(MKS) in the Gdansk shipyards made no special provisions for the more 
poorly paid workers. The economic demands were across the board: in- 
creased market supplies, meat rationing, wage increases of 2000 zlotys per 
month, and automatic cost-of-living raises (Robinson, 1980, pp. 49-50). 
After the initial wage increases granted to the strikers in August, the 
government stuck to the position that the poorest paid workers should 
receive the most increases. In a speech on August 15 Prime Minister 
Babiuch agreed that there would be no further meat price increases for 
two years. Wage increases had to be tied to productivity except for low 
income and retired people and large families. He also pledged to reduce 
the gap between minimum and maximum wages. 
As the port strikes grew during August, the MKS also grew and no 
doubt became more heterogeneous. Although the initial demands of 
MKS had few provisions for the poorer workers, these concerns increas- 
ingly were incorporated in the demands of the strikers. The initial de- 
mand in Gdansk for a uniform wage increase, for example, was modified 
during bargaining with the government by a formula asking for 1000 
zlotys monthly for poorer workers, and 500 zlotys for all others (Robin- 
son, 1980, p. 365). It is apparent that the differences between the 
workers and the government were complicated by differences among the 
workers themselves. And the position of the government on these 
economic issues was closer to that of the poorer workers, demanding 
disproportionate wage and benefit increases for the lower paid. 
The tension within the MKS may have facilitated the final agreements 
reached in Szczecin and Gdansk at the end of August. Both these 
agreements reflect much greater emphasis on social policy than the 
original demands of the strikers. In the Szczecin agreement, signed 
August 30 (translated in Robinson, 1980, pp. 416-18), the economic pro- 
visions were aimed largely at the needier groups in Polish society. The 
government promised "a gradual raise in the pay of all employee's 
groups," but "primarily the lowest wages." There were also promises to 
raise minimum wages and pensions, improve maternity and family 
allowances, improve the health service, and to initiate a "program to 
solve the housing problem." 
The results of the Gdansk agreements (translated in Robinson, 1980, 
pp. 423-34) were much the same. On many of the social policy issues 
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the government went beyond the workers' demands, but not always 
precisely fulfilling other economic and political requests. To the key 
economic demand to "raise the basic salary of each worker by 2000 zloty 
per month" the government agreed to "gradual increases for all working 
groups," but "especially to the lowest paid groups." The agreements also 
made specific reference to "a program of pay increases . .. for those earn- 
ing the least, with particular attention to families with many children." 
In response to the workers' demands for automatic pay increases to keep 
up with inflation the government agreed to consider new rules on this 
matter, but these rules were "to take into consideration the problem of the 
'social minimum.' " As with the Szczecin agreement the Gdansk pact in- 
cluded other provisions for improvements of social policy, housing, 
preschool facilities, pensions, minimum wages, family and maternity 
allowances, and health care. Some of these were among the original "21 
demands," but some were not. 
The 1980 events were similar to those of 1956 in that they derived from 
a sense of frustrated expectations. In 1956 the expectations were newly 
formed and the realization of them insufficiently fast. In 1980 the expec- 
tations were born of genuine gains in the early 1970s. 
In all three cases the revolts occurred after a period in which social 
policies had been emphasized and wage differentials reduced. The 
frustrations, therefore, were felt most keenly by the more highly paid 
workers who saw their own positions slipping more so than other sectors 
of society. This is not the only reason that skilled workers initiated the 
protests. But it is these workers who benefited most from the system of 
incentives, and who had the most resources for the purchase of consumer 
goods. When they experienced a contraction of both wages and the 
availability of consumer goods they were bound to feel aggrieved. 
THE Poucy DEBATES OF 1980-81 
In the sixteen months after August the workers and Solidarity pushed 
for, and got, major concessions from the government in both social policy 
and consumer policy. Even though the national income shrank sharply 
in 1981, the percentage of national income in consumption continued to 
grow past the record level of 1980. Virtually every facet of the economy 
contracted in 1981 while wages increased by 25 percent (as did the cost of 
living, neutralizing this gain). 
In social policy the workers got most of what they had asked for in the 
Gdansk agreements, and more. The minimum monthly wage was raised 
from 1800 zlotys to 2400 in September 1981, and to 2800 in early 1982. 
The minimum pension was raised from 1800 zlotys to 3000. Family, 
maternal, and child care allowances also were raised substantially. All of 
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this was an enormous drain on the budget. As the official report on the 
1981 budget noted: "expenditures for social security increased by half, for 
health care, education and other social and cultural needs by one fourth, 
and for municipal economy and housing by one fifth. The total increase 
reached 90 billion zlotys, the largest such increment in our economy" 
(Rzeczpospolita, May 27, 1982). 
The interest in protecting the most needy during the crisis was evident 
in major policy documents adopted by both Solidarity and the party dur- 
ing 1981. In Solidarity's program adopted at the union's October Con- 
gress (Tygodnik Solidarnosc, October 16, 1981), there were frequent 
references to Solidarity's special commitment to protect and support the 
"weakest groups of people," "the poorest," and "those for whom life is 
hardest." There are specific provisions to establish "a social minimum as 
the guiding principle of incomes policy" and for efforts to protect the in- 
comes of "the least powerful parts of society." The union opposed wage 
and social inequalities between places of work and regions. But, as 
Solidarity's critics were quick to point out, the program did not once use 
the word "socialism." 
Despite this omission, probably largely symbolic, Solidarity's commit- 
ment to social policy was similar to that of the Party in its "Program for 
the Development of Socialist Democracy" adopted at the Extraordinary 
Ninth Congress in July 1981 (translated in Stefanowski, 1982, pp. 
171-86). The party program had numerous provisions for improving the 
status of families, particularly young ones, the needy, and the poorly 
paid. These included increases in maternity and family credits and 
allowances, health care and child care facilities, pensions, and social pro- 
grams in rural areas. The party document was less sweeping but more 
specific than Solidarity on incomes policy. Although there was no men- 
tion of a social minimum as the "guiding principle" of incomes policy, 
there was an appeal for raising the lowest salaries and pensions and even a 
specific formula for the relationship of the lowest and highest incomes: 
the lowest salary should be half of the average; the highest should be no 
more than three and one-half times the average. 
But it is evident from the party's program that it still was bedeviled by 
the problem of multiple priorities. Despite the obvious commitment to 
developing social policy, in listing the priorities for investments, these 
areas did not fare well. Resources were to be concentrated in "food, the 
building industry, expansion of the fuel, raw material and power base, 
health protection, and culture and education," in that order. The regime 
was trying to provide the population with the basics only, food and hous- 
ing, while moving to re-establish the production of raw materials as an in- 
dustrial base and for export. 
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THE DILEMMA OF MARTIAL LAW 
At the end of 1981 the Polish economy was in much the same state as it 
had been in the later 1970s: in trying to push ahead on all fronts 
simultaneously there were increasingly fewer resources in all areas. The 
imposition of martial law on December 13 was at least partially a political 
move, to protect a disintegrating party from the increasingly strong and 
political labor union. But it also was meant as an economic emergency 
measure. Jaruzelski believed that in the increasingly critical economic 
situation the economy no longer could withstand Solidarity's strike ac- 
tions, and the government could make no further concessions on wages. 
Even one of Solidarity's advisors (Tymowski, 1981) argued that the 
union's demands were unrealistic in the current economic situation: 
"there can not be simultaneously a contraction of the work week, an in- 
crease in wages, and an improvement in market supplies in the economic 
situation in which we find ourselves." 
With Solidarity suspended and strikes prohibited the martial law 
regime could move ahead with its own economic reform program, in- 
cluding substantial food price increases, without fear of opposition and 
disruption. In the first six months of martial law the regime began a 
policy of reducing consumption while temporarily boosting social services 
to help the needy through the crisis and the readjustment. There were 
frequent articles in the press aimed at reducing expectations, pointing out 
the long time frame for economic recovery. Meat consumption was a 
particularly touchy issue. Per capita meat consumption was expected to 
decline for the next five years or so, but nevertheless would not fall below 
the levels of 1971. 
To offset the food price increases of February 1982 there were income- 
compensation formulas that particularly benefited young families, pen- 
sioners, and the poorly paid. The regime committed itself to the "care of 
those worst off." It was asserted that the role of the state budget must 
change to "protect the weakest social groups during the reform," so that 
social policy was to make up 30 percent of the 1982 budget, compared to 
22 percent in 1981 (Rzeczpospolit~a, May 27, 1982). 
There were also renewed promises to reduce the highest incomes, 
"earned by a narrow group of people usually representing the private sec- 
tor," but this was to be accomplished with a progressive income tax rather 
than administrative measures, in line with the new economic reform pro- 
gram. On the other hand, there were no further commitments to in- 
crease wages, even for those earning the least. 
In fact, by the middle of 1982 it apparently had been decided that there 
could be no further allocations for social welfare or consumption until the 
economy began to pick up. As Minister Krzak said in a Sejm speech in 
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May: "we must break out of the trap of promises allowing for future 
development of social benefits and wages. Welfare in the future must 
match economized incomes" (Rzeczpospolita, May 27, 1982). The wage 
system was criticized for having "more of a social than a motivational 
nature." The new principle guiding wage policy was "pay according to 
one's work" and basic wages were to constitute a higher proportion of 
total remuneration by cutting back on various allowances, bonuses, and 
awards. 
Thus, after several years of unsuccessfully attempting to drive ahead in 
all three policy areas, social policy, consumption, and investments, the 
martial law regime was scaling back. With extremely limited flexibility 
and resources it was going to focus on investments, temporarily abandon- 
ing the other two areas after a final infusion of funds there to maintain at 
least minimal standards. In the early 1970s the Gierek regime had ini- 
tiated a multifaceted growth strategy, but the economy and the society 
could not sustain it. In 1980 the workers essentially had forced the same 
strategy on the authorities, but the economy was even less able to support 
such growth than it has been ten years earlier. By this time, in par- 
ticular, Poland had exhausted its credit in the West which had been used 
to finance the growth of the 1970s. 
The policy changes of 1982, resulting in immediate reductions in con- 
sumption (through price increases) and eventual cutbacks in social policy, 
were bound to be unpopular with the workers and Solidarity.8 The new 
economic reform program would require major new investments in 
agriculture, energy, and export industries. At the same time imports, 
especially from the West, would have to be reduced. 
It was inevitable that the standard of living was to decline for everyone, 
and the official media attempted to brace the population for such 
changes. But these shifts in policy, like all previous ones, were to affect 
different groups in different ways. With the reduced emphasis on social 
policy it was likely that the poor would suffer the most. Indeed, the 
ranks of the poor already were growing. As a government spokesman 
pointed out: 
Various groups of families are threatened now, who earlier did not need any assistance from 
society. Now, not only old and lonely people need help but also young; not only single 
parents, but also normal families. Economic reform designed to produce economic effects in 
a natural way limits social functions performed by work establishments (Trybuna Ludu, 
April 17-18, 1982). 
The combined effects of the crisis and the reform also undermined one 
of the fundamental concepts of social policy and socialist societies, that of 
8 The Polish workers largely have internalized the values of socialism and especially of 
egalitarianism. See Simon (1983), Mason (1983), and Bielasiak (1983). 
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full employment. It was expected that in 1982 alone 20,000 secondary 
school graduates and 8,000 university graduates would not find jobs. 
Besides them thousands of workers lost their jobs as a result of the 
contracting economy and the dislocations of the reform program. The 
policy of "wages according to work" theoretically could benefit the more 
efficient workers. But as long as the economy stagnates, and the regime 
tries to impose the reform program, it is unlikely that this will happen. 
The Jaruzelski regime, then, is faced with a series of dilemmas. The 
decentralizing economic reform depends on workers' participation and 
cooperation. But the workers are unlikely to support any program of a 
regime that suspended the most popular social institution in the country's 
history. The reform program inevitably involves dislocations. But the 
economy is already in such a critical state that any further dislocations are 
bound to increase resentments among workers and tension in the society. 
Furthermore, in every case in the past where the regime effected major 
shifts in policy the resulting shifts of economic burdens and benefits in 
society eventually led to popular unrest. The combination of these ten- 
sions makes Poland a tinderbox. Given the lack of communication be- 
tween the martial law authorities and the workers, it is unlikely that an 
explosion can be averted without the regime allowing the workers to 
organize themselves in their own way. 
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